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Beyond Iraq and
Afghanistan:
Introduction
Clint Watts,
Director of PJ Sage,
Inc.
watts@pjsage.com
Recent information
on foreign fighters
in Iraq and
Afghanistan provides
an updated picture
of future terrorist
threats to Western
interests. Based on
newly-released
detainee data from
Guantanamo and
foreign fighter
records captured in
Iraq, we can now
more precisely
identify trends in
al-Qa’ida
recruiting. Although
the data tells us
little about
fighting inside Iraq
and Afghanistan, it
reveals a great deal
about the modern
Sunni mujahid who
fights as a
volunteer in Middle
East conflicts:
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He is a young man
who likely comes
from a handful of
cities in North
Africa and the
Middle East—what I
call flashpoint
cities. He is
probably from a
country that has a
high infant
mortality rate, a
high unemployment
rate, and few civil
liberties.
-
The mujahid was not
mobilized by
Internet content or
a centralized
recruiting
organization but
instead by a
returning foreign
fighter or a local
religious leader.
The returning
fighter or religious
leader told him how
to travel to a
country where he
could engage in
combat. The mujahid,
and probably some
friends, traveled by
a commercial plane
or ground
transportation to a
country that
neighbors the
conflict area and
then paid a local
smuggler to get him
in.
-
The mujahid’s
financial assets and
spending habits vary
between countries.
If he is Saudi, he
will contribute
significantly more
money to the fight.
Meanwhile, a
Moroccan will give
his life as a
suicide bomber but
does not have much
cash to spare.
Regardless of
location, the
mujahid is also
likely unemployed or
a student (which
usually amounts to
the same thing) or
works as a common
laborer. He is not
necessarily
impoverished but has
time on his hands
and a lack of
purpose, making him
more susceptible to
radicalization and
giving him enough
free time to travel
in support of jihad.
If he has experience
fighting, he will
elect to fight; if
not, he will elect
to be a suicide
bomber.
In addition to
informing the above
profile of al-Qa’ida’s
foot soldiers, the
data suggests
alternative
techniques for
countering the
organization and its
foreign fighter
recruits in North
Africa and the
Middle East. This
study, which will be
released serially,
examines the
asymmetric nature of
foreign fighter
recruitment, the
utility of smuggling
networks for
counter terrorism,
varying motivations
for martyrdom, and
trends for future
terrorism analysis
with the drawdown of
forces from Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Two caveats: First,
this study does not
analyze the threat
of terrorism from
South Asia. Pakistan
still remains the
headquarters of al-Qa’ida,
and the diversity of
Pakistani militant
groups pose a
serious foreign
fighter threat as
well, evidenced by
attacks in the
United Kingdom and
elsewhere. However,
the records from
Sinjar and
Guantanamo Bay do
not support analysis
of this phenomenon.
Second, in addition
to detainee data
available from
Guantanamo, this
study is based on my
own analysis of the
Sinjar records
released in December
2007. A recent
Combating Terrorism
Center study
identified 595
discrete entries
from the translated
Sinjar records,
whereas I found only
563 unique fighter
records stating a
country of origin
outside of Iraq. For
a complete
description of the
data, see Appendix A
and the
PJ Sage
Foreign Fighter
Database.
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